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INTRODUCTION
As feminism has come of age, it has powerfully instantiated itself in global
governance.1 What are the tools feminism has borrowed-even co-opted-to
embed itself within governance? Do these tools enhance or diminish the
liberatory potential of feminism? To investigate these questions, this article
critically examines one tool-the use of gender indicators in global governance,
with a focus on the World Bank's relatively new Women, Business and the Law
program (WBL). 2 In focusing on the World Bank-an enormous producer and
consumer of data-this article explores a microcosm of the recent explosion and
popularity of gender indicators.
This article borrows a working definition of "indicator" used by Professors
Kevin Davis, Benedict Kingsbury, and Sally Engle Merry, who "subsume[ ]
indexes, rankings, and composites which aggregate different indicators" to refer
to:
[A] named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the
past or projected performance of different units. The data are generated
through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex social
phenomenon. The data, in this simplified and processed form, are
capable of being used to compare particular units of analysis (such as
countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time,
and to evaluate their performance by reference to one or more
standards .
Because development of indicators often requires mathematical skills and
quantitative expertise, technical experts-who are not necessarily elected nor
subject to close scrutiny by the public-typically lead the establishment and
elaboration of indicators, as well as the norms they embody. This raises
accountability questions and can make such indicators hard to contest. At the
same time, because indicators themselves are seen as scientific, objective, and
1. Cf Catherine Powell, How Women Could Save the World, If Only We Would Let Them: From
Gender Essentialism to Inclusive Security, 28 YALE J. OF L. & FEMINISM (forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter
Powell, How Women Could Save the World].
2. See Women, Business and the Law 2016: Getting to Equal, WORLD BANK, http://wbl.worldbank.org
(last visited April 22, 2016).
3. Kevin E. Davis, Benedict Kinsbury & Sally Engle Mary, Introduction: Global Governance by
Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION
AND RANKINGS, 3, 6 (Kevin E. Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kinsbury, and Sally Engle Mary, eds.,
2012) [hereinafter Davis et al. Global Governance by Indicators].
[Vol. XVII:777
GENDER INDICATORS AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
neutral, they seem to possess authority, impartiality, consistency, and efficiency,
which policymakers find attractive for measuring and marking change.4
Gender indicators are quantitative metrics that measure progress in securing
gender equality.5 While this article views gender indicators as potentially
powerful tools for reframing the discourse of law and development, it argues that
in the context of the World Bank WBL program, indicators fall somewhat short,
at least on feminist terms. Rather than transforming the development paradigm,
the WBL gender indicators insert feminism into the prevailing (male-oriented)
framework. As the WBL program itself admirably acknowledges (discussed
further in Part IV), due to methodological limitations, its gender indicators focus
on formal (not substantive) equality, the formal economy (without addressing the
informal sector), and positive law (with limited coverage of customary law). By
emphasizing the formal legal and economic spheres in this way, the WBL gender
indicators largely ignore the private realm-(re)entrenching the public/private
divide that feminist scholars have long criticized.6
Why is this important? In measuring and coaxing inclusion of women into
existing, traditional "male-oriented" structures of law and markets, these gender
indicators measure law on the books (more than law in practice), fail to account
for the substantial challenges women face in the unregulated informal economy,
and miss the ways women's roles are socially constructed-often based on
customary practices and "tradition"-which can, inter alia, relegate women to
unpaid or underpaid work, such as caregiving. The WBL program recognizes
these shortcomings in their reports and notes that measuring progress in the
formal legal and economic spheres is, at least, a good start.7 The problem,
however, is that because of the World Bank's influence, their gender indicators
become proxies for women's progress, and, as discussed further below, member
states use the Bank's indicators to make substantial decisions (including funding
and establishment of reform agendas).8
4. Id. at 13-15.
5. For examples of the rise of gender indicators, see e.g., Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State,
U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the Evidence and Impact: Closing the Gender Data Gap
Conference, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/195244.htm (July 19, 2012);
U.N. Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Rep. of the Secretary- General, U.N. Doc.
S/2010/173 (Apr. 6, 2010) (promoting gender indicators to evaluate and facilitate the integration of
gender in peace and security); Jim Yong Kim, President, World Bank, Remarks at the Evidence and
Impact: Closing the Gender Data Gap Conference, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2012/07/
19/remarks-world-bank-group-president-jim-yong-kim-evidence-impact-closing-gender-gap (July 19,
2012) (personally launching a gender data portal in one of his first public appearances as Bank President).
The Evidence and Impact conference was co-hosted by the World Bank, the U.S. State Department, and
the polling firm, Gallup.
6. See, e.g., Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to
International Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches].
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra in Part I.
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Therefore, the WBL program is a good example of "Governance Feminism," a
construct Professor Janet Halley and her co-authors promote to analyze and
critique the ways "feminists and feminist ideas get incorporated (or not) into
state, state-like, and state-affiliated power." 9 On the one hand, Governance
Feminism signals the fact that (at least some) feminists now "walk the halls of
power."' But on the other hand, while Governance Feminism has helped
feminism move to the mainstream, it has had its costs: "Women benefit
differentially; some are harmed; and conflicts among feminists about what
worlds to imagine are prematurely settled."11 Thus, as Dianne Otto notes, efforts
to theorize about Governance Feminism must reckon with "familiar accounts of
feminist attempts to engage with international law and its institutions, [which]
tell a saga of [ongoing] 'marginalisation,' 'silencing,' and 'talking to our-
selves."' 12 Exploring the complexity-indeed the paradox-of Governance
Feminism, Halley and her coauthors explore its limitations and risks, even as they
celebrate its achievements. 
13
This article draws on the notion of Governance Feminism to examine how
feminism has become embedded in the World Bank through the use of gender
indicators that measure the legal rights of women on a country-by-country basis.
I conclude that while feminism has shaped the way the Bank pursues law and
development, the transformative potential of feminism within the Bank has been
limited by the strictures of the formal equality doctrine and the formal economy.
Even as feminism has influenced the Bank's policies and funding, it has done so
on the Bank's terms. In effect, the Bank has co-opted feminism to advance the
Bank's economic growth agenda, rather than the other way around to advance
feminism's more redistributive agenda.
I ground these conclusions about feminism and its limits through exploration
of two clusters of questions about gender indicators at the World Bank. First,
what do gender indicators tell us about whether feminism is changing global
9. Janet Halley, Describing andAssessing Governance Feminism, in Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran,
Rachel Rebouche, and Hila Shamir, Governance Feminism: An Introduction (forthcoming) (manuscript
at 1) [hereinafter Halley, Describing and Assessing Governance Feminism]. Others view this
phenomenon through the lens of "gender mainstreaming," but this article focuses on the intertwining of
feminism and governance.
10. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM 21 (2006)
[hereinafter HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS].
11. Halley, Describing and Assessing Governance Feminism, supra note 9, at 4. ("Merging into the
mainstream can ... consolidate a particularistic, identity-based project, sometimes at the expense of
alternative affiliations that ignore the siren call of victimization and identity... [and] [s]ome of the best
things within and about feminism get left out.").
12. Dianne Otto, Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International Law Through the UN
Security Council, 32 AusTL. FEMINIST L.J. 97, 97 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
13. HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS, supra note 10, at 29-32; Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir
& Chantal Thomas, From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape,
Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29
HARv. J.L. & GENDER 335, 341-42 (2006) [hereinafter Halley et al., Four Studies in Contemporary
Governance Feminism].
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governance or whether governance is changing feminism? Does governance by
indicators have a de-radicalizing effect on feminism? Put another way, can
feminism use the master's tools (i.e., indicators) to, if not, dismantle the master's
house (i.e., the prevailing legal doctrine that draws a sharp dichotomy between
public/private law, formal/informal economy, and constitutional/customary law),
at least substantially renovate it (i.e., by at least moving beyond the current
limitations of formal equality, the formal economy, and the formal constitution)? 14
Second, when using indicators to measure legal rights in the context of gender
equality, what do these quantitative measurements make visible, and what do
they obscure? What are the normative and practical implications of quantifying
equality for feminism? And what are the implications of economizing gender
equality for breaking down gender hierarchy?
1 5
Early scholarship on Governance Feminism (and critiques of it) centered on
criminal punishment, specifically in the context of sexual violence in war and
trafficking. 16 This scholarship identifies "'the fierce turn in American feminism
toward the state,"' particularly the tendency toward criminalizing "'bad things
that men did to women[.]' ' 17 In shifting from international criminal law to law
and development, my objective here is to build on this earlier scholarship, but
make a unique contribution by analyzing the turn to the state to monetize feminist
values through indicators.1 8
Numeric indicators are a classic governance device for identification, alloca-
tion, and evaluation. Tracing the "genealogy of indicators," anthropologist
14. See AUDRE LORDE, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER
OUTSIDER 110, 112 (1984) ("For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may
allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine
change."); see also Otto, supra note 12, at 98 (invoking Lorde as a critique of Governance Feminism).
15. As Galit A. Sarfaty notes:
[T]hings really happen in the Bank when an economic case could be made for them. You put
[them] in economic language .... It [ ] became acceptable internally to talk about corruption
when people could show with cross-country regressions that it's related to lower growth ....
People needed [economic-based evidence] to say that "OK, it's all right for us to work on this."
So one obstacle would be to try and articulate rights issues in the way that economists could
understand.
GALIT A. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE WORLD BANK 107,
127 (2012) [hereinafter SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION] (discussing the trend toward economizing
human rights within the World Bank) (quoting a March 14, 2006, interview with an official with the
World Bank Development Research Group); see also id. at 131 (discussing quantifying the social capital
concept and translating it econometrically).
16. See, e.g., Halley et al., Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism, supra note 13; Kelly
Askin, A Decade of the Development of Gender Crimes in International Courts and Tribunals: 1993 to
2003, 11 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 10TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE 16, 16 (2004). Otto, supra note 12.
17. John Sutherland, The Ideas Interview: Janet Halley, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 87, 2006) http://www.
theguardian.com/world/2006/aug/08/gender.academicexperts (interview quoting Halley).
18. While working on this project, I have learned that Halley et al are working on an edited book,
which will collect analysis of Governance Feminism in a variety of areas of law. See, e.g., Janet Halley,
Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouche, and Hila Shamir, Governance Feminism: An Introduction at 4
(Minn. U.P. forthcoming).
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Sally Engle Merry describes the rise of indicators as a "project of modernity,"
noting:
Numbers as an instrument of knowledge production were developed
first for business transactions ... and subsequently as instruments of
state governance ... for administration and tax . . ., but it is only with
the development of the modem state that statistics have been used to
describe the characteristics of populations themselves. 
1 9
Within legal scholarship, the continued growth of empirical studies, such as
within law and economics, has proliferated. In the development field, indicators
drive decision-making in policy and program design, implementation, and
monitoring and evaluation.20 This article synthesizes feminist criticism, empiri-
cal studies, and law and development literature2 1 to analyze the emergence of
gender indicators as a tool of global governance in vital decisions concerning the
allocation of international assistance.22
The World Bank promotes a dual narrative about why gender equality as a
legal norm matters for development. First, "gender equality matters in its own
right, because the ability to live the life of one's own choosing and be spared from
absolute deprivation is a basic human right, to be enjoyed by everyone, whether
one is male or female.",2 3 Second, gender equality "matters instrumentally,
because greater gender equality contributes to economic efficiency and the
achievement of other key development outcomes.,
24
19. Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance, 52
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 583, S89 (2011) [hereinafter Merry, Measuring the World].
20. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: GENDER EQUALITY AND DEVELOPMENT 37
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 WDR ON GENDER]; USAID, GENDER EQUALITY AND FEMALE EMPOWERMENT
POLICY 1 (2012), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf docs/PDACT200.pdf [hereinafter USAID, GENDER POLICY];
Memorandum from the Development Economics Vice Presidency and Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management Network for World Bank's staff, Engendering Justice: A Gender Assessment's Impact on
Project Design (May 2005), http://wwwl.worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnote98.pdf; Andrew D.
Mason & Elizabeth M. King, Preface to WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT -THROUGH
GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND VOICE, at xii (2001), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curatedlen/2001/01/891686/engendering-development-through-gender-equality-rights-resources-voice.
21. Note that the law and development field itself sits at the intersection of economic, legal, and
institutional theory. See David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and
Development Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND DEVELOPMENT:
A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 1 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter Trubek & Santos,
New Critical Practice].
22. This article, thus, builds on my broader interest in new governance approaches (beyond gender) to
diagnosing, managing, and solving transnational problems. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Libya: A
Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM. J. INT'L L. 298 (2012).
23. 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20, at 47.
24. Id.; see also SARATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION, supra note 15, at 115-20 (discussing the Bank's
use of intrinsic and instrumentalist claims in the context of human rights). As discussed below in Part I,
the Obama Administration has echoed this dual frame, for example, in the President's first National
Security Strategy. WITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 38 (2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/rss viewer/national security strategy.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
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While focused on the World Bank's WBL program, this article considers the
broader ecology within which gender indicators have flourished to identify
lessons about law reform, global governance, and transnational feminism. In so
doing, it examines the implications of utilizing a technology of corporate
governance-numerical measurement and analysis-as an instrument of the
modern state and now, by extension, multi-governmental institutions.2 5 The WBL
program's indicators provide a useful case study because they inform the Bank's
own work and influence its partners (including aid recipients and donors) and
other stakeholders.
Increasingly, governments and international organizations have relied on
quantitative indicators to make the case that investing in women and girls yields
not only beneficial development outcomes for the sake of women and girls
themselves, but also positive outcomes for whole communities, for whole
nations, and even for the pursuit of international peace and prosperity.26 Further,
the claim that economic development experts at the World Bank and elsewhere
make is that investing in women and girls leads to more sustainable outcomes
and is thus a more efficient use of resources than prior development strategies that
failed to use gender as a pathway for scarce, targeted resources.2 7
The goal of this article is to interrogate what is gained and what is lost through
the use of gender indicators in the service of these ambitious claims. Do such
quantitative metrics make gender inequality more visible and therefore more
susceptible to remediation? Does the use of data create (at least the illusion of)
greater objectivity and accountability (to taxpayers at the national level and
shareholders at the international financial institution level)?
Conversely, in what ways do numbers obscure certain forms of gender
dominance and subordination that are not easily reducible to quantification (such
as gender-based violence and women's empowerment and autonomy)? Empiri-
cism often relies on proxies to measure these phenomena. But is the solution to
come up with more and better data? As discussed further below, the problem is
Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
Administrator Raj Shah each issued gender policy guidances, further raising the profile of this dual
narrative within the Administration. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICY GUIDANCE: PROMOTING
GENDER EQUALITY TO ACHIEVE OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES (2012),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/189379.pdf [hereinafter STATE DEPT, GENDER POLICY GUID-
ANCE] (fact sheet) (summarizing internal policy guidance cable); Rajiv Shah, Message from the
Administrator in USAID, GENDER POLICY, supra note 20, at iv.
25. For a broader consideration of the use of indicators in transnational law and regulation, see, for
example, Davis et al., Global Governance by Indicators, supra note 3 (collecting case studies across
various fields of transnational law).
26. See, e.g., Melanne Verveer, Why Women Are a Foreign Policy Issue, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 12,
2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/23/why women are a foreign policy issue (re-
flecting based on the author's purview as then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Ambassador-at-Large
for Global Women's Issues from 2009 to early 2013); 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20, at 6; Powell,
How Women Could Save the World, supra note 1.
27. See, e.g., 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20, at xiii; USAID, GENDER POLICY, supra note 20,
at 3.
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that data's claim of objectivity, combined with its inherently biased nature,
suppresses feminist goals.28
Because international law has been traditionally based on relations between
states, feminist theorists have criticized its structure for masking gender
inequality in the private sphere (for example, in the market) and by private actors
(for example, by obscuring accountability for gender- and sexual-based violence
by an abusive spouse or a private militia leader).29 This article investigates how
using gender indicators fits into prevailing accounts and critiques of international
law and global regulation.
The article is organized in five parts. Part I analyzes the World Bank's dual
narrative on why gender equality matters for development. That the instrumental
value of gender equality (as told through gender indicators) has been emphasized
over its intrinsic value represents a strategic choice to get institutional buy-in.
But, it also represents a normative choice that has practical implications. Part II
discusses the rise of indicators as a mode of governance, including in the
development assistance field and, by extension, the law and development field.
Part III provides an overview of the burgeoning construction and use of gender
indicators as a mode of Governance Feminism within the United Nations (U.N.)
family (including within the World Bank's WBL program) in response to earlier
indicators that were insufficiently attentive to gender. Part IV summarizes
criticism of gender indicators for falling short in the way they have been
conceived, interpreted, and deployed. Much of the criticism of gender indicators
involves methodological arguments, rather than arguments questioning the
normative implications of relying on indicators as a way to evaluate gender
justice. Building on these critiques, Part V returns to the normative-and by
extension practical-implications of the turn to gender indicators (and the
motives underlying them), concluding with thoughts about how gender indicators
might fit more meaningfully into the feminist project.
I. THE WORLD BANK'S DUAL NARRATIVE: THE INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL
VALUE OF GENDER EQUALITY
A. THE WORLD BANK'S DUAL NARRATIVE
While highlighting both the intrinsic value and the instrumental value of
gender equality, the World Bank's work inherently privileges the latter. Because
of its role as a development institution that focuses on economic growth and
efficiency, the Bank views gender primarily from a cost-benefit perspective. The
Bank's core mission is to "[e]nd extreme poverty within a generation and boost
shared prosperity" 30 -and its agenda has expanded to include a comprehensive
28. See infra text accompanying notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
29. See Charlesworth et al., supra note 6, at 614-15 for an example of feminist critique.
30. About the World Bank, WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about (last visited Apr. 3,
2016).
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set of programs to advance this mission. To pursue this mission, the Bank leans
on its comparative advantage-utilizing economic analysis and promoting
market-friendly policies.
31
The Bank's 2012 World Development Report-which took gender equality
and development as the primary theme-is an example of this dual narrative.
32
The Report initially states that gender equality is a core objective with its own
intrinsic value. It describes gender equality as "a process of expanding freedoms
equally for all people."
' 33
However, the Report then largely focuses on the instrumental justification for
gender equality as being "smart economics. 34 From the Bank's perspective,
gender equality is "an instrument for development" because "it can enhance
",35economic efficiency and improve other development outcomes in three ways.
First, eliminating gender barriers in education, economic opportunities, and
productive inputs "can generate broad productivity gains [.]' ,36 Second, "improv-
ing women's absolute and relative status feeds many other development
outcomes, including those for their children., 37 Third, gender equality is an
instrument for development through "leveling the playing field" and facilitating
"more representative .... more inclusive institutions. 38
This emphasis on the instrumental value of gender equality over its intrinsic
value is an institutionally strategic decision. The World Bank, the U.N. system
generally, and national governments have sought to mainstream gender through-
out their organizational structures. 39 Pitching gender equality as facilitating
broader goals of these institutions is more likely to secure buy-in by the
31. Jessica Einhorn, Interview with the Author, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept. 1, 2001), http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/64199/jessica-einhom/interview-with-the-author (responding to letters in reaction to the
author's earlier piece, The World Bank's Mission Creep, FOREIGN AFF. (Sept/Oct. 2001), http://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/57235/jessica-einhom/the-world-banks-mission-creep).
32. 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20.
33. Id. at 3 (citing and paraphrasing AMARTYA K. SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999) [hereinafter
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM]). The Bank's Report also cites to the U.N. Millenium Development
Goal 3 on gender equality and the main international treaty on women's equality, Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Id.; see generally GENDER &
DEv. GRP. IN THE POVERTY REDUCTION & ECON. NETWORK, WORLD BANK, GENDER EQUALITY AS SMART
ECONOMICS: AWoRK IN PROGRESS (2011), http://bit.ly/1ospFzE [hereinafter GENDER EQUALITYAS SMART
ECONOMICS].
34. 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20. To be fair, a section of the Report focuses on "promoting
women's agency[,]" which, along with other references sprinkled throughout the Report, includes
references to the ways in which women's agency "has intrinsic relevance for women's individual
well-being and quality of life." Id. at 151. Nevertheless, the bulk of the Report-even the section on
women's agency-is focused on the "instrumental relevance" of women's equality and empowerment.
35. Id. at 3.
36. ld.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20; STATE DEPT., GENDER POLICY GUIDANCE, supra
note 24.
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leadership of these organizations, who are frequently men4 0 or, regardless of their
gender, may not necessarily view gender equality for its own sake as an
institutional priority.
Thus, increasingly, international organizations, national foreign ministries, and
development agencies are touting the key links between gender equality on the
one hand and economic prosperity and even world peace on the other.4 1 As the
World Bank's 2012 World Development Report says in its opening paragraph,
"[g]reater gender equality can enhance productivity, improve development
outcomes for the next generation, and make institutions more representative.,
42
The U.S. National Security Strategy echoes this, stating, "[e]xperience shows
that countries are more peaceful and prosperous when women are accorded full
and equal rights and opportunity., 4 3 The World Bank views the monetary benefits
40. Micah Zenko & Amelia Mae Wolf, Leaning from Behind, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 24, 2015),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/24/leaning- from-behind-women-foreign-policy-media/.
41. See Catherine Powell, How Women Could Save the World, supra note 1, at 3 n.5 and
accompanying text (discussing how instrumentalist strategies to promote gender equality secure broader
institutional buy-in than equality or moral claims).
42. 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20, at xx.
43. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 24, at 38; see Lucy Madison, In Farewell Speech,
Clinton Calls for "Smart Power" on Global Stage, CBS NEWS (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/
8301-250 162-57566994/in-farewell-speech-clinton-calls-for-smart-power-on-global-stage/ [hereinaf-
ter Madison, Farewell Speech] (quoting former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as saying: "The jury is
in. The evidence is absolutely indisputable: If women and girls everywhere were treated as equal to men
in rights, dignity, and opportunity, we would see political and economic progress everywhere."); see also
Mary-Katherine Ream, USAID Launches New Gender Policy, IIP DIGITAL (Mar. 1, 2012), http://iipdigital.
usembassy.gov/st/english/article/2012/03/201203011512.html#axzz2b6DzOGzH ("This is the first time
in 30 years the U.S. government has updated and issued a formal approach to gender and development,
officials said. It reveals a fundamental shift in the aid community's conversation on women."); Rajiv
Shah notes:
This is the first time in 30 years that the U.S. government is updating and issuing a formal
approach to gender in development. It's an extraordinary thing to believe when you are aware
of all of the data and insight and learning that has come out over the last three decades about
how investing in women as the solution to development and human rights challenges around
the world is a core evidence-based strategy to achieve success. But now we are hopefully
correcting for a few lost decades in terms of making that central insight a definitive part of our
approach to our work.
Rajiv Shah, USAID Gender Policy Rollout, The White House, (Mar. 1, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v-FMaf3D7JdRM. (Relevant time 12:17-12:55).
The first Gender Policy Guidance issued by the State Department notes:
Evidence shows that investments in women's employment, health, and education are correlated
with greater economic growth and more successful development outcomes. Engaging women
as political and social actors can change policy choices and makes institutions more
representative and better performing. And a growing body of evidence shows that women bring
a range of unique experiences and contributions in decision-making on matters of peace and
security that lead to improved outcomes in conflict prevention and resolution.
STATE DEPT., GENDER POLICY GUIDANCE, supra note 24; see also USAID, GENDER POLICY, supra note 20.
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of investing in women and girls as "smart economics., 44 Similarly, former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to promoting the status of women as an
exercise of "smart power.",
45
At the same time, economizing gender involves a process of translation that
can be viewed as a form of adaptation to an organizational culture-or, as
Professor Sally Engle Merry puts it, a form of "vernacularization"-adopting the
local vernacular or language.46 Economics and quantitative analysis are the
vernacular (or local language) of the World Bank. However, vernacularization
has its limits, both as a normative matter and as a practical one. Normatively,
vernacularization tends to involve adopting or co-opting the local culture.4 7
Therefore, liberatory projects such as feminism may be sapped of their
emancipatory potential when confronting an organization's dominant ideology.48
As Professor Galit Sarfaty notes, "a paradox of vernacularization" is that a
project that otherwise seeks to challenge practices, policies, and structures of an
institution may end up losing its own normative valence in the face of a
potentially more powerful one. 49 Applying this insight to the World Bank, while
feminist economists have been quite adept at adopting the Bank's local
vernacular of economics and quantitative analysis, by their own admission,50
their effort to translate gender equality into the language of the Bank has
diminished the normative valence of feminism's critique of the formal equality,
formal law, and the formal economy.
B. THE BANK'S GENDER INDICATORS ENTRENCH THE DUAL NARRATIVE
The World Bank's gender indicators use the local vernacular of the Bank-
economics-which shifts the normativity of the gender equality project from a
focus on equality for its own sake to equality as a beneficial factor in facilitating
development. As a practical matter, the emphasis on indicators "neglects what
44. See, e.g., GENDER EQUALITYAS SMART ECONOMICS, supra note 33; 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra
note 20, at xx ("Gender equality is ... smart economics."); id. at 3 ("Gender equality matters for
development-It is smart economics.").
45. Madison, Farewell Speech, supra note 43 (quoting Clinton as pointing to gender equality as an
example of smart power-a compromise between hard, military power and the soft power of moral
suasion-because gender "is not only a moral issue. Which of course it is. It's an economic issue and a
security issue .... It therefore must be central to U.S. foreign policy."); see also Verveer, supra note 26
(Verveer, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's Ambassador-at-Large for Global Women's Issues,
states that "promoting the status of women is not just a moral imperative but a strategic one; it's essential
to economic prosperity and to global peace and security. It is, in other words, a strategy for a smarter
foreign policy.").
46. Sally Engle Merry, McGill Convocation Address: Legal Pluralism in Practice, 59 McGILL L.J. 1,7
(2013).
47. Id.
48. SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSITION, supra note 15, at 151.
49. Id. at 141.
50. See discussion, infra, Part IV.
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cannot be counted ' 51 and obscures women's empowerment, voice, and agency.52
The emphasis on the instrumental value of gender equality fits into a broader
trend toward "evidence-based investments ' 3 and "results-based management. 5 4
This trend toward quantification often means that indicators are deployed as
proxies to measure activities that are otherwise hard to quantify. For example,
measures of "women's empowerment" must rely on proxies of autonomy, such as
whether a woman needs her husband's permission to travel, sign a contract, buy
land, etc., as a formal matter. Furthermore, activities (such as training programs,
enrollment, or graduation rates) are presumed to correspond to particular
outcomes (i.e., educational attainment). However, in practice, women and girls
may have difficulty obtaining a quality education for any number of reasons,
including violence, harassment, lack of childcare, lack of safe and affordable
transportation, etc.
At the same time, gender indicators have helped advance a feminist agenda
within the development landscape by threading the needle of instrumentalist
economic growth and efficiency goals within narratives concerning the intrinsic
value of gender equality. This is apparent in the assessments gender indicators
have helped shape-on a range of gendered phenomena-from "missing
women" and "missing girls,"5 6 to the "Girl Effect, 5 7 to evaluating persistent
51. Sally Engle Merry, Firming up Soft Law: The Impact of Indicators on Transnational Human
Rights Legal Orders, in TRANSNATiONAL LEGAL ORDERS 374, 395 (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer
eds., 2015) [hereinafter Merry, Firming up Soft Law].
52. See supra note 34 for discussion of women's agency within the Bank's instrumentalist framework.
53. USAID, GENDER POLICY, supra note 20, at 1; see also Danny Leipziger & Eckhard Deutscher,
Foreword, in EQUALITY FOR WOMEN: WHERE Do WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 3?, at
xv (Mayra Buvinic et al. eds., 2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/
EqualityforWomenfinal.pdf (the coauthors worked for World Bank and OECD, respectively) ("There is
compelling evidence of the importance of gender equality for poverty reduction and sustainable growth.
So it should come as no surprise that most development actors-international agencies, bilateral donors,
and most developing countries-have an official policy for promoting gender equality.") (emphasis
added).
54. See generally United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Results Based Management: Concepts
and Methodology (July 2000), http://web.undp.org/evaluation/documents/RBMConceptsMethodgyjuly
2002.pdf.
55. Merry, Firming up Soft Law, supra note 51, at 382.
56. Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, 37 N.Y. REv. BOOKS (1990),
http://ucatlas.ucsc.edu/gender/Senl00M.html (while the numbers have since been updated, Sen intro-
duced the phenomenon and estimated that 100 million women were "missing"-their potential existence
extinguished through infanticide or inadequate nutrition during infancy); see also 2012 WDR ON
GENDER, supra note 20, at 15 (discussing how the phenomenon of "missing girls" and "missing women"
is based not only on preference for sons, discrimination, and social norms, but also on poor institutions
that "force households to choose among many bad options" and "multiple service delivery failures").
57. Prominently branded by the Nike Foundation, the "Girl Effect" relies on the empirical claim that
"investing in a girl stops poverty before it starts." Maria Eitel, The Girl Effect, CNN, (Sep. 19, 2011, 4:00
AM), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/09/19/the-girl-effect!; see also Stuart Elliot, Nike
Harnesses Girl Effect Again, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/giving/
11VIDEO.html (tracing the roots of the "Girl Effect" campaign back to Nike's "if you let me play"
campaign regarding the participation of women and girls in sports and noting that while the "Girl Effect"
campaign rebrands poverty, it is purposefully not branded as Nike). Data on the "Girl Effect" website
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gaps and discrimination in numerous areas. These narratives are powerful and
penetrating, in large part because of the story the numbers tell. Girls and women
are more likely to die; girls' school enrollment continues to be low; women
everywhere tend to earn less; women are more likely to do unpaid family work or
to work in informal sectors; women are underrepresented in the upper echelons of
formal politics and have less say in decisions and control over household
resources.
5 8
The World Bank itself attributes the persistence of such gender inequalities to a
variety of factors that numbers alone may not be able to fully diagnose, such as
the fact that there may not be a single institution or policy "fix" that is blocked,
multiple constraints that are mutually reinforcing (in ways that are not easily
measurable), and entrenched social norms and gender roles, including notions
surrounding caregiving and housework.5 9
C. GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: ToP-DOwN OR BOTTOM-UP?
Steps to address persistent gender inequality are more sustainable when
assessed and addressed through both bottom-up and top-down forms of
governance. 60 Top-down methods involve experts and other policymakers taking
leadership in developing and/or imposing decisions, while bottom-up solutions
involve affected individuals and communities taking the lead in crafting and/or
implementing decisions to improve their own destiny. As discussed further
below, governance by indicators tends to be top-down (from international
development agencies or donors to national governments to affected individuals
or communities).
reflects that "when we all invest in girls, everyone wins[J" since such investments lead to improvements
in income (as each additional year of secondary school increases a girl's eventual wages by 15 to 25
percent) and in health (as mothers get more schooling, their infants and children will be healthier). Id. An
independent website on the "Girl Effect" campaign is available at http://youthinkyouknowme.girleffect.
org/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2014); accord Rajiv Shah, Message from the Administrator, in USAID, GENDER
POLICY, supra note 20 at iv ("[I]in other cases-boys are falling behind. With [the new USAID gender
equality] policy, we can ensure our values and commitments are reflected in durable, meaningful results
for all."); see also Judith Warner, Is There Really a 'Boy Crisis'?, TIME IDEA (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://ideas.time.com/2013/03/21/the-boy-crisis-is-it-fictional/ (concluding, based on current research,
that American boys face challenges due to gendered social experience and expectations as well as
because of "class" (income and education level). The study recommends against "pit[ting] boys' needs
against those of girls or view[ing] one gender's success as a zero-sum game that requires the relative
failure of the other .... The solution is rather to realize that a rising tide of educational expectation will
raise all boats.").
58. 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20, at xxi. Even in a rich country, such as the United States,
women are at a disadvantage. "Women may control 65% of global spending, but in the United States,
where that number is higher, we represent only 3% of Fortune 500 directors."
59. 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20, at 13-14 (pointing, in particular, to the "sticky domains" of
health and mortality, the economy, and agency in society and in household decision-making).
60. Cf Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three
Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 125 (2005).
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However, bottom-up decision-making can, in some circumstances, be more
agile, better informed, more targeted, and more effective, as affected individuals
and communities will likely feel greater ownership over the solutions and
therefore have more of an interest in sustaining them.6 1 As a social justice
method, bottom-up decision-making-which has deep roots in feminists' con-
sciousness-raising methodologies-is also more likely to reflect the intrinsic
value of "the ability to live the life of one's own choosing. 62
Top-down indicators appear objective, neutral, and scientific. However, their
selection and reproduction often require discretion, judgment, and preference.
But they actually mask political struggle over questions of power, gender,
development, corporate responsibility, rule of law, and human rights as "technical
questions of measurement, criteria, and data accessibility., 63 Since such debates
often rely on technical expertise, the creation and interpretation of an indicator
frequently involves a "slippage ... in the way ... problems are defined, in the
identity and role of experts, [and] in the relative power of the people engaged in
producing and using [the] indicator[] ....
By exercising the "power of naming" in labeling the category to be measured,
determining what is included in or excluded from the category, and setting forth
parameters for measurement, the use of an indicator is an exercise of hege-
mony.65 Indeed, indicators are typically created in the global North, while the
data collection (particularly in the context of development assistance) occurs in
the global South, seemingly enlisting the subject being measured in
self-regulation.6 6
This form of control and regulation has been called "government at a
distance., 67 These standards promote "self-governance among the governed" 68
in ways that have become so naturalized and ingrained that we rarely question
these forms of social control and self-control. Common examples of self-
governance through which individuals and institutions submit to evaluation
61. See, e.g., ISOBEL COLEMAN, PARADISE BENEATH HER FEET: How WOMEN ARE TRANSFORMING THE
MIDDLE EAST 188 (2013) (discussing how World Bank-supported community-led development initiatives
in Indonesia and Afghanistan were considered success stories, particularly where, for example in
Afghanistan, villagers "had little reason to trust their long-dysfunctional government and believed that
community-led development was the only way forward.").
62. 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20, at 3.
63. Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 19, at 588. Merry points out:
Political debates about compliance shift to arguments about how to form an indicator, what
should be measured, and what each measurement should represent .... The outcomes appear
as forms of knowledge rather than as particular representations of a methodology and
particularly political decisions about what to measure and what to call it. Id.
64. Id.
65. John M. Conley, Comment, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 593 (2011) (response to Merry,
Measuring the World, supra note 19).
66. Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 19, at 589-90, S93.
67. NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE SoUL: THE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF xxii (1989).
68. Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 19, at S89.
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measured by numbers include: grades and GPAs; SAT and LSAT scores; U.S.
News and World Report higher education rankings; reports to donors evaluating
project outcomes; and even indicators for faculty productivity pegged to
allocation of academic research grants.6 9
The World Bank's turn to gender indicators 70 has tended to be both top-down
and bottom-up because its WBL program relies on both input from in-country
practitioners to document national laws and World Bank databases to collect
information on women's rights issues selected by the WBL program. 1 Perhaps
because the Bank functions as both a bank that can resource gender equality
through its financial assistance and a social justice agency, it provides both
top-down and bottom-up support when working with national and subnational
governments. An example of the Bank's experience with supporting bottom-up
development is its support for the establishment of the National Solidarity
Program in Afghanistan, which relied on input from community-based councils
comprised of democratically-elected leadership structures to determine how to
use development funds from the Bank.7 2
D. GENDER INDICATORS FALL SHORT IN THE PROJECT OF TRANSFORMATION
The role of gender indicators in the WBL program can be understood as
advancing (yet falling short in realizing) three transformative projects: (1)
feminist transformation, (2) legal transformation, and (3) economic transformation.
Feminist transformation: First, on the feminist theory front, the history of the
WBL program reflects a classic example of Governance Feminism, with
feminists within the World Bank developing and gaining acceptance for gender
indicators within the context of an institution whose approach to development is
deeply informed by quantitative indicators. Feminist economists and lawyers
infiltrated the Bank, using the language of banking, to develop gender indicators
(discussed infra, Part III) that help advance a legal and economic justice reform
agenda for women and girls.73 The WBL is a cross-disciplinary enterprise of
lawyers, economists, and other experts who bring a variety of understandings
about feminism to the table, often in consultation with outside stakeholders in
69. Id. at 589-90. But see Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Law School Matrix: Reforming Legal
Education in a Culture of Competition and Conformity, 60 VAND. L. REv. 515 (2007) (criticizing the
LSAT).
70. See, e.g., 2012 WDR ON GENDER, supra note 20 (noting the World Bank's turn to gender
indicators); see also Kim, supra note 5 (noting that the Bank also launched the Gender Data Portal in
2012).
71. WORLD BANK GRP., WOMEN, BusINEss, AND LAW 2016: GETTING TO EQUAL 31 (2015), [hereinafter
2016 WBL REPORT] (this was the most recent report available at the time of this writing, with the first
biennial report having been issued in 2010).
72. See ISOBEL COLEMAN, PARADISE BENEATH HER FEET: How WOMEN ARE TRANSFORMING THE
MIDDLE EAST 188-89 (2010) (discussing how the visionary behind the National Solidarity Program was a
former World Bank official, Ashraf Ghani, who went on to become Afghanistan's finance minister (after
the fall of the Taliban) and was elected to the Afghan presidency in 2014).
73. Telephone Interview with WBL Staffer (Mar. 28, 2013).
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poor countries, in which the Bank works, as well as with elite development
professionals and advocates who can access the Bank's elaborate organizational
structure.74 As discussed infra, Part III, in developing and advancing gender
indicators, feminists within the World Bank have used the "master's tools"
(quantitative metrics) to reform, not transform, the "master's house" (the World
Bank).
Legal transformation: Second, on the legal reform front, the WBL program
uses gender indicators to measure progress in women's rights, for example, in
access to credit, jobs, and property75 (again, discussed infra, Part III). However,
the use of gender indicators reveals several limitations about law, development,
and the use of quantitative empiricism to draw conclusions about law and
development. An initial limitation is that, despite their appearance of scientific
objectivity, indicators are far from neutral and rest on normative assumptions
about which legal rights are counted, how they are counted, and what the goals of
legal reform should be.76 Another limitation is that legal variables are challenging
to measure "in the face of legal complexity and uncertainty., 77 A final limitation
is that, since the notion of development is in itself contested, measuring how legal
rights and law reform advance "development" turns on a contested idea that may
be problematic, if the path to development is one that replicates existing
structures of dominance and subordination in "developed" countries. 78
Economic transformation: Third, on the economic front, while the WBL
program does not provide funding itself, its gender indicators are used by other
agencies, such as the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (discussed below)
74. Id.
75. Press Release, World Bank and IFC, Many Societies Gradually Moving to Dismantle Gender
Discrimination, Yet More Can Be Done, Says World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim (Sept. 26,
2013), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2013/09/24/societies-dismantle-gender-
discrimination-world-bank-group-president-jim-yong-kim [hereinafter Press Release, World Bank and
FC].
76. For example, there is substantial debate about how to measure the right to be free of gender-based
violence. As Sally Engle Merry notes, there has been disagreement about whether and how to measure the
severity and extent of violence; whether to include mental or psychological violence; how to account for
the potential underreporting of violence against women to law enforcement; and whether to take into
account subjective factors such as fear of violence. Merry, Firming up Soft Law, supra note 51, at 384,
386, 384. "[T]he content of indicators is fundamentally shaped by a focus on what is countable and what
forms of data already exist or can be acquired in a way that seems 'objective."' Id. at 394.
77. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis & Michael B. Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing
Business Project, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1095 (2007) [hereinafter Davis & Kruse, Taking the Measure of
Law].
78. See id. at 1108-10; see also Trubek & Santos, New Critical Practice, supra note 21, at 7-8
(describing efforts to broaden the definition of development to include "human flourishing as its
benchmark" rather than merely "a purely economic conception"). Despite the complexities of
quantifying legal rights (or perhaps because of these complexities), my interest in selecting the World
Bank's WBL program as a focus of this article was to focus on an initiative in which law is doing some
work.
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that make funding decisions. 79 As an international financial institution, the World
Bank generally sits at a pivot point between public and private international
governance to move money and resources. Substantially more money and
resources began to flow to so-called "gender-informed" projects from fiscal year
2010 to fiscal year 2012,80 with the total share of "gender-informed" lending
rising from fifty-four to eighty-three percent during this time period.8 1 According
to the Bank, "[t]his translates into a dollar figure in FY12 of almost US$29 billion
in gender-informed loans, out of a total lending envelope of US$34 billion."8
2
The work of the WBL program has arisen within this context. However, it is not
clear how much of the reported increase in "gender-informed" lending represents
new investment, as opposed to merely recasting investments that would have
been made in any event. The value of increasing investment in "gender-
informed" projects will depend on the extent to which these investments actually
make a difference in improving the lives of the women who are the beneficiaries
of these projects.8 3
One large donor partner, the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC),
is a development agency that relies heavily on the set of gender indicators
compiled by the World Bank's WBL program (discussed infra, Part III).
Congress established the MCC in 2004 as an independent bilateral U.S. foreign
aid agency based on President George W. Bush's call for a "new compact for
79. See Guide to the Indicators and the Selection Process for Fiscal Year 2015, MILLENNIUM
CHALLENGE CORP. (October 9, 2016), https://www.mcc.gov/pages/docs/doc/report-guide-to-the-indicators-
and-the-selection-process-fy-2015 [hereinafter MCC, Guide] (discussing the MCC's methodology for its
Gender in the Economy Indicator, a composite indicator that combines a number of WBL gender
indicators).
80. "'Gender-informed' means that gender has been taken into account in at least one of three
dimensions-analysis, actions, and monitoring and evaluation." WORLD BANK, UPDATE ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GENDER EQUALITY AGENDA AT THE WORLD BANK GROUP 16 (2012), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23283845/DC2012-0012(E)Gender.pdf.
According to the Bank, the benefit of approaching "gender-informed" projects with regard to these three
dimensions "is its simplicity and that it is amendable to self-assessment, thereby increasing accountabil-
ity [and ease of application, since] the ratings on each dimension are binary, not subjective judgments
about quality." Id. "Gender-informed" projects include initiatives such as a "[c]ollaboration between the
Bank, the Water and Sanitation Program and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation in Kenya, which [ ][]
integrated gender into the water sector through a series of capacity-building initiatives[,] includ[ing]
collection of gender-disaggregated data, policy dialogue around how to include gender in water laws, and
South-South learning in Colombia, India and Peru." Id. at 7-8.
81. Id. at 15 (and 16, for chart). The Bank reports that "[flour out of five projects approved by the
Board in FY12 were gender informed." Id.
82. Id. However, the Bank makes the caveat that "[i]t is important to recognize that the corporate
commitments to assess gender mainstreaming are applied at the ex ante stage-relating to the design and
objectives of the operations. As such, these are important instruments for enhancing accountability, but
do not function to capture results on the ground." Id. at 16.
83. Cf SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION, SIGAR 15-24-AR, AFGHAN
WOMEN: COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENTS NEEDED TO DETERMINE AND MEASURE DOD, STATE, AND USAID
PROGRESS 12 (2014), http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR-15-24-AR.pdf (noting that U.S. agencies
have failed to provide a comprehensive assessment confirming that the gains Afghan women have
made-which these agencies tout and take credit for-are actually traceable to development assistance).
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development, defined by new accountability for both rich and poor countries
alike."84
While the WBL program provides a broad array of data about gender
inequality, the MCC has translated these data into a composite "Gender in the
Economy Indicator," which was added in 2012 to the MCC's list of "selection
criteria" for making determinations over allocation of development aid to eligible
countries. As a single composite score, the "Gender in the Economy Indicator"
benefits from simplicity and marketability (internally and externally), but it has
the downside of potentially diluting explanatory power by synthesizing the
complexity of gender equality into one number. 86
Thus, the WBL's gender indicators have traveled from an international
institution (the World Bank) to a U.S. agency (the MCC), and then overseas,
through the MCC's international assistance program to recipient countries.
Prospective grantees are encouraged to improve gender equality laws and
policies that affect their MCC Gender in the Economy Indicator score,
demonstrating the influence that gender indicators have when they are tied to
economic assistance in this way.
II. THE RISE OF INDICATORS AS GOVERNANCE
The rise of gender indicators is part of a wider trend regarding indicators as
governance. Indicators are "technologies of knowledge developed in the
economic domain [that have] move[d] uneasily into ... newer fields."8 7 Indica-
tors reframe "broad normative statements about justice and rights into .... the
economistic language of targets and goals that can be measured[,]" shifting "a
justice-focused set of norms to a more technical rational one that crosses more
readily into non-legal fields, such as development[.]" 88 Established initially in the
context of business transactions and financial management, indicators involve
"[p]ractices of measuring phenomena that are relatively easily counted, such as
money or inventories of goods, [but that have been] transplanted into domains far
less amenable to quantification, such as frequency of torture or prevalence of ill
health."89 While "[i]ndicators are a basic technology of corporate management
and control... [t]he spread of its techniques of auditing and counting to the state
84. The Millennium Challenge Account, THE WTE HOUSE (last visited Mar. 27, 2016), http:II
georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/developingnations/millennium.html.
85. MCC, GUIDE, supra note 79, at 4.
86. See discussion infra Part III.
87. Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 19, at S88.
88. Merry, Firming up Soft Law, supra note 51, at 375-76.
89. Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 19, at S88; see also id. at S89 (noting also that
"[q]uantification... become[s] increasingly important to a variety of government and business
functions.., from developing cost-benefit measures for locating railroad lines to the need to measure life
spans by life insurance companies...").
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and civil society is an instance of [ ] seepage of the corporate form."90 Because
economists dominate the development assistance field, this field has quite readily
adopted indicators as a technology for producing and disseminating knowledge. 91
From measures of the ease of doing business to the enjoyment of basic human
rights, the practice of auditing and quantifying has exploded within global
governance institutions, ranging from the World Bank's Doing Business project
to treaty bodies spearheaded by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights. 92 "[W]ith their apparently simple and straightforward meanings," the
reliance on numbers "produces an unambiguous and easily replicated field for
judgment. 9 3 Indicators, such as law school rankings and grade point averages,
are alluring because they appear objective, neutral, and "evidence-based., 94
"Numbers have become the epitome of the modern fact," which is "basic to the
ways Westerners have come to know the world. 95 However, the use of indicators
often masks a large degree of subjectivity and ideology.96
While experts with experience in statistics and other technical fields typically
spearhead the development of indicators, "successful" indicators can gain
acceptance by broader publics, sometimes to such a great extent that they can
come to stand in for the underlying phenomenon they were intended to
measure. 97 "[S]uch categorization gradually becomes an accepted 'black box'
90. Id. at S90-92 (pointing to various ways the boundaries between corporate and other domains of
society have become blurred and intertwined, including indicator-based funding, outsourcing of data
collection and evaluation to private-sector consultants, and the use of indicators in corporate
responsibility programs, such as the U.N. Global Compact). Indeed, "[t]he expansion of indicator
technology into new domains and spaces of governance is another way the corporate form is reshaping
contemporary social life." Id. at 593.
91. Cf SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE WORLD BANK,
supra note 15, at 127 (quoting interview with official, Human Development Network, World Bank,
Washington, DC (Feb. 14, 1996) ("[T]hings really happen in the Bank when an economic case could be
made for them")).
92. See, e.g., Davis & Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law, supra note 77, at 1095; AnnJanette Rosga &
Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
253 (2009); see also Davis et al., Global Governance by Indicators, supra note 3, for a broader collection
of examples.
93. Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 19, at 588.
94. Rajiv Shah, Message from the Administrator, in USAID, GENDER POLICY, supra note 20, at iv
(explaining that the gender policy "provides guidance on pursuing more effective, evidence-based
investments in gender equality" and supports "requirements to ensure that every strategy and project is
shaped by a gender analysis and establishes common indictors for judging our success").
95. Merry, Measuring the World, supra note 19, at 589 (citing MARY PoovEY, A HISTORY OF THE
MODERN FACT: PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SCIENCES OF WEALTH AND SOCIETY (1998)).
96. See generally LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY: DEMOCRATIZING HIGHER
EDUCATION IN AMERICA (2015) (noting that, in relying on rankings, such as test scores and GPAs,
American universities rely on a merit system that prioritizes admission for privileged, elite individuals,
rather than creating learning communities oriented toward advancing democratic societies); Sturm &
Guinier, supra note 69 (criticizing the fact that LSAT scores reinforce a culture of competition and
conformity rather than predict how well law school applicants will perform in law school, much less the
legal profession).
97. Merry, Firming up Soft Law, supra note 51, at 391-92.
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which no longer needs to be explained and justified," 98 thereby producing a kind
of "truth" or "illusion of knowledge"-"a way to know a world that is
unknowable and to govern a world that is ungovernable." 99
In the development assistance field, the Human Development Index (HDI) is
an example of a prominent indicator that enjoys broad acceptance. 0 0 Instead of
focusing primarily on economic growth through Gross National Product (GNP),
the HDI follows Nobel laureate and Harvard economist Amartya Sen's capacities
approach to development by measuring other indicators of well-being, such as
access to health and education.10 1 The HDI reports assert that "non[-]income
measures [of well-being] should be an integral component of any assessment of
well-being as they measure important aspects of well-being directly, while
income is only one among several inputs generating such well-being." 10 2 When
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) first introduced the HDI as
part of its first annual Human Development Report, it was notable that the HDI
initially expressed development through an index that ranked countries based on
their human development and on combined economic and social factors. But as
the new indicator became accepted and established, it became "settled"
as the new normal and is now virtually presented as a fact about a country's
98. Sally Engle Merry, Measuring Violence against Women, in THE SEDUCTIONS OF QUANTIFICATION:
MEASURING SEX TRAFFICKING, GENDER VIOLENCE, and Human Rights Sally Engle Merry, ed), at 53
(forthcoming 2016), http://www.law.uvic.ca/demcon/2012%20readings/violence%20ag%20women.pdf.
99. Id. at 395. For a thoughtful discussion of this, consider Sally Engle Merry's cautionary note:
One of the puzzles of indicators is the extent to which they are used and even considered
reliable despite widespread recognition of their superficiality, simplification, and neglect of
context and history .... This is a seductive form of knowledge. It promises certainty and
clarity and provides readily comparable information that facilitates decision-making. [T]his
apparent clarity accounts for their growing popularity. Indicators and other numerical forms of
knowledge subdue the thorny difficulties of making decisions about incommensurable social
practices, issues, and problems.
Id. at 395; see also the work of scholars in science and technology studies, who have provided insight
regarding the consequences of classification on knowledge production; see generally GEOFFREY C.
BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR, SORTING THINGS OUT: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1999);
BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: How TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY
(1987); THE MUTUAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATISTICS AND SOCIETY (Ann Rudinow et al. eds., 2011).
100. Davis et al., Global Governance by Indicators, supra note 3, at 20 (citing as other prominent
examples Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, Freedom House's Freedom in the
World indicator, and the World Bank's Doing Business indicators); see also Wendy Nelson Espeland &
Michael Sander, The Dynamism of Indicators, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH
CLASSIFICATION AND RANKINGS 87 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012) (focusing on U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REPORT law school and other educational rankings as another example of a prominent indicator).
101. Amartya K. Sen, Foreword, in READINGS IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS, MEASURES AND
POLICIES FOR A DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM vii-xiii (Sakiko Fukuda-Parr & A.K. Shiva Kumar eds., 2005);
see generally SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM, supra note 33.
102. Kalpana Bardhan & Stephan Klasen, UNDP's Gender-Related Indices: A Critical Review, 27
WORLD DEV. 985, 985 (1999).
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level of development. 10 3
III. THE EMERGENCE OF GENDER INDICATORS
The WBL indicators can be usefully considered within the broader ecology of
gender indicators to demonstrate that other leading gender indicators share the
WBL's limitations. Before turning to analyze the World Bank's WBL program,
this section summarizes three prominent sets of gender indicators in the law and
development field in the context of: (A) the UNDP Human Development Index
and Report, (B) U.N. Millennium Development Goals, and (C) the World
Economic Forum.10 4 While these three sets of indicators are composites of data,
as discussed further below, the WBL program's biennial reports provide
responses to questions (mainly structured to elicit "yes/no" answers) that reveal
simple statistics on legal differentiations (i.e., "Can women work the same night
hours as men?").
1 0 5
A. UNDP GENDER INDICATORS
The construction of gender indicators in the development field emerged in
response to earlier indicators that were viewed as insufficiently attentive to
gender, such as the HDI. 10 6 In its 1995 Human Development Report-which
focused on gender-UNDP introduced two new gender-related indexes: the
Gender-related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender Empowerment
Measure (GEM). 10 7 The GEM gauged women's empowerment by measuring
women's agency in political and economic life.10 8 By contrast, the GDI factored
gender inequality into the overall HDI assessment, modifying the HDI by
imposing a welfare penalty for gender inequality in the HDI's components-life
expectancy, educational attainment, and per capita gross domestic product
(GDP).10 9 To obtain the GDI, the HDI was adjusted downward to the extent there
were gender gaps in these three areas, in effect "penalizing" the HDI if gender
inequality existed. 1 0
103. Sally Engle Merry, Global Legal Pluralism and the Temporality of Soft Law, Special Issue on
Temporalities of Law, 46 J. OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL L. 108, 116 (2014); Firming up Soft
Law, supra note 51, at 377-78.
104. While this article focuses on gender indicators in the context of law and development, the U.N.
Secretary-General has also recommended gender indicators as part of its implementation of U.N.
Security resolutions on women, peace, and security.
105. 2016 WBL REPORT, supra note 71, at 44-247 (listing the questions and answers).
106. Caren Grown, Indicators and Indexes of Gender Inequality: What Do They Measure and What
Do They Miss?, in EQUALITY FOR WOMEN: WHERE Do WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 3?
93, 98-137 (Mayra Buvinic et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Grown, Gender Inequality].
107. United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development Report, at 72 (May 22, 1995),
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/256/hdr 1995 en complete nostats.pdf.
108. Grown, Gender Inequality, supra note 106, at 93.
109. Id. at93, 114.
110. Id. at 104 (explaining that the greater the gap between men and women in the HDI components,
the more the GDI varied from the HDI); see also Bardhan & Klasen, supra note 85, at 985-86 (noting that
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In response to criticism-both conceptual and methodological-of the GEM
and GDI, UNDP launched the Gender Inequality Index (GII) in the 2010 Human
Development Report.111 The GII seeks to deliver a comprehensive picture of
gender inequality by measuring women's status in three dimensions: empower-
ment, economic activity, and reproductive health. 112 This index is unique from
other indices in that it focuses on critical issues of educational attainment,
economic and political participation, and female-specific health issues.
11 3
Marking an improvement over the GEM and GDI, the GII permits analysis of
women's issues not only in relation to men, but also in light of issues that do not
affect men in a comparable way (like reproductive health). 114 A further
improvement is that the GII uses a more holistic approach by capturing
components that were previously gauged with separate empowerment and
development indices.'
1 15
B. U.N. MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS GENDER INDICATORS
A separate set of gender indicators emerged in the context of the U.N.
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).1 16 The U.N. Millennium Declaration
identifies eight development goals with time-bound targets and quantifiable
indicators. 117 The goal for gender is embodied in the third goal, MDG3, whose
objective is to "promote gender equality and empower women."118 The target for
MDG3 is to "eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education,
preferably by 2005, and at all levels of education no later than 2015."' 119
Measuring progress toward this target was operationalized as the ratio of girls' to
boys' enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary education. Three additional
official indicators were added for MDG3: ratio of literate females to literate
males among 15- to 24-year-olds; the percentage of nonagricultural wage earners
who are women; and the proportion of parliamentary seats held by women. 
120
more so than the GEM, "the GDI suggest[ed] that gender inequality is not only a problem for those it
disfavors, but that it detracts from overall development in a country").
111. Arnie Gaye et al., United Nations Dev. Programme, Measuring Key Disparities in Human
Development: The Gender Inequality Index, Research Paper 2010/46 (2010).
112. Ld.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women, UN.oRG, http://www.un.org/
millenniumgoals/gender.shtml (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) [hereinafter Goal 3].
117. U.N. General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept.
8, 2000), http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm.
118. Goal 3, supra note 116.
119. Id.
120. Mayra Buvinic & Andrew R. Morrison, Introduction, Overview, and Future Policy Agenda, in
EQUALITY FOR WOMEN: WHERE Do WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 3?, at 1 (Mayra
Buvinic et al. eds., 2008) [hereinafter Buvinic, Introduction].
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While seen as useful by international development professionals, the official
MDG3 indicators came under strong criticism. 121 The Millennium Project Task
Force on Gender Equity suggested twelve indicators to replace the official
MDG3; however, many of the recommended indicators required data that were
not widely available. 122 The World Bank's 2007 Global Monitoring Report
(GMR) suggested a more modest, feasible list of supplemental indicators to
complement, rather than replace, the official MDG3 indicators, 123 which feminist
economists within the World Bank, who helped pioneer these additional
indicators, referred to as the "MDG3 plus" approach. 124
C. THE WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM'S GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX
In 2006, the World Economic Forum introduced another prominent gender
indicator, the Global Gender Gap Index. 125 The Index "convert[s] data into
male/female ratios, which are then truncated according to an 'equality bench-
mark' and a somewhat elaborate weighting procedure." 126 This index includes
five components of gender inequality: economic participation, economic opportu-
nity, political empowerment, educational attainment, and health and well-
being. 127 While it originally included female-specific measures (similar to the
GII) as well as gender gaps, it now includes only achievement disparities
between men and women. 128
D. THE WORLD BANK'S WOMEN, BUSINESS, AND LAW GENDER INDICATORS
In contrast to the three composite indicators discussed above, the World Bank's
WBL biennial reports focus on a narrower set of concerns based on simple data
collection involving gender equality in work and business. The WBL program
measures how laws, regulations, and institutions "differentiate between women
and men in ways that may affect women's incentives or capacity to work or to set
up and run a business." 129 In 2016, the WBL program issued its fourth biennial
121. Andrew R. Momrison et al., The State of World Progress, 1990-2007, in EQUALITY FOR WOMEN:
WHERE Do WE STAND ON MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOAL 3?, 33, 33-34 (Mayra Buvinic et al. eds.,
2008).
122. Id. at 35.
123. Id.
124. Buvinic, Introduction, supra note 120, at 10 ("The additional indicators recommended in our
MDG3 plus approach are: i) primary completion rates disaggregated by gender; ii) under-five mortality
rates disaggregated by gender; iii) percentage of reproductive-age women and their partners using
modern contraception; iv) percentage of 15- to 19-year-old girls who are mothers or pregnant with their
first child; v) labor force participation rates for 20- to 24- and 25- to 49-year-olds, disaggregated by
gender; and vi) average hourly wages, also disaggregated by gender.").
125. WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL GENDER GAP INDEX 2014 (2014), http://www3.weforum.
org/docs/GGGR14/GGGRMainChapterAppendices 2014.pdf.
126. Gaye et al., supra note 111, at 6-7.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 7.
129. Press Release, World Bank and IFC, supra note 75; see also About Women, Business and the
Law, WORLD BANK, http://wbl.worldbank.org/aboutus (last visited July 6, 2015).
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report on legal differences based on gender.1 30 The 2016 report included 173
economies, covering seven subject areas (accessing institutions, using property,
getting a job, providing incentives to work, building credit, going to court, and
protecting women from violence). 1 31 Methodologically, the data collected in the
WBL report is based on a wide array of information, including survey questions
answered in-country as well as verification against the text of laws in each
country. 
1 3 2
However, as mentioned earlier, once the MCC obtains the WBL data, it
collapses it into a composite "Gender in the Economy Indicator." In fact, the
MCC bases its composite indicator on a more limited set of activities than are
covered in the WBL report. 
1 3 3
President George W. Bush paved the way for the MCC, which was established
to "deliver smart U.S. assistance by focusing on good policies, country
ownership, and results .... [The MCC was designed to] benefit[ ] both developing
countries and U.S. taxpayers through: competitive selection[,] country-led
selection[, and] country-led implementation" of projects. 134 It has provided over
$8.4 billion in development assistance to governments, based on "Scorecards" it
calculates to "evaluate policy performance [based on] objective and quantifiable
policy indicators in three broad policy categories: Ruling Justly, Investing in
People, and Encouraging Economic Freedom." 
1 35
130. 2016 WBL REPORT, supra note 71.
131. Press Release, World Bank and IFC, supra note 75. Significantly, the 2014 report also piloted the
"protecting women from violence" indicator, covering 100 countries. WORLD BANK & IFC, WOMEN,
BusINEss AND THE LAW 2014: REMOVING RESTRICTIONS TO ENHANCE GENDER EQUALITY 4 (2013),
http://wbl.worldbank.org/reports//media/FPDKMIWBL/Documents/Reports/2014/Women-Business-and-
the-Law-2014-FullReport.pdf [hereinafter 2014 WBL REPORT].
132. The 2016 WBL report includes indicators constructed through answers by practitioners in each
country with expertise in family and labor law, representatives of civil society organizations who work on
gender issues. These responses were verified by cross-checking: "codified sources of national law,
including constitutions, codes, labor codes, law, statutes, rules, regulations and procedures in areas such
as labor, social security, civil procedure, tax, violence against women, marriage and family inheritance,
nationality and land." 2016 WBL REPORT, supra note 71, at 31.
133. While the WBL's reports pose scores of questions across the six main topics covered, the MCC
bases its Gender in the Economy Indicator solely on ten activities: (1) getting a job, (2) registering a
business, (3) signing a contract, (4) opening a bank account, (5) choosing where to live, (6) getting
passports, (7) traveling domestically, (8) traveling abroad, (9) passing on citizenship to their children, and
(10) becoming heads of households. Compare id. at 45 with Gender in the Economy Indicator,
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CoRP., https://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/indicator/gender-in-the-economy-
indicator (under "Methodology")) (last visited Apr. 10, 2016).
134. About MCC, MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CoRP., http://www.mcc.gov/pages/about (last visited Mar.
25, 2013). The MCC was established largely in reaction to the view that the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) had many different, conflicting goals, frequently growing out of political pressure
and not resulting in long-term economic progress. Patrick Cronin, The Rebirth of USAID, DAILY CALLER
(May 4, 2010), http://dailycaller.com/2010/05/04/the-rebirth-of-usaid/ ("The problem is not so much
USAID as the proliferation of goals and authorities and earmarks that have often satisfied Washington's
powerbrokers at the expense of promoting development around the world.").
135. MCC, GUIDE, supra note 79.
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The "Gender in the Economy Indicator" was added in 2012-to much
fanfare-as a "selection indicator" (for selecting aid recipients) under the
"Encouraging Economic Freedom" rubric (though it relates to the other two
policy categories-"Ruling Justly" and "Investing in People"-as well). Girls'
education-both primary school completion and secondary school enrollment-
were already included as independent MCC indicators, 136 but there had been no
indicator pertaining to adult women. The "Gender in the Economy Indicator"
utilizes the WBL data, although simplified to one number, through which MCC
,.measures the [aid-recipient] government's commitment to promoting gender
equality by providing women and men with the same legal ability to interact with
the private and public sector." 
137
In its guidelines explaining its indicators and aid selection process, the MCC
states two rationales linking greater economic equality for women to growth and
poverty reduction. 138 The first rationale is that studies show that gender
inequality significantly harms the economic growth of a country aid recipient, as
inequality "prevents a large portion [of] the population from fully participating in
the economy[.]" 139 Women are underrepresented in the formal labor market and
as entrepreneurs and are overrepresented in the "female" informal sector, which
depresses wages in the "female" sectors. 140 The second rationale is that
"[r]esearch shows that when women have access to employment, investment in
children's health, nutrition, and education often increases, promoting higher
levels of human capital." 141 Both of these rationales are instrumentalist, viewing
women's equality as important not necessarily for the sake of women, but rather
to grow national economies or improve the well-being of children.
IV. CRITICISM OF GENDER INDICATORS
While the criticisms of most gender indicators are methodological, this article
is mainly concerned with more conceptual matters, which the World Bank's
WBL program itself has, to its credit, raised openly.
A. THE WORLD BANK'S WOMEN, BUSINESS, AND LAW GENDER INDICATORS
Due to the newness of both the World Bank's WBL program and the MCC's
"Gender in the Economy Indicator," there is little independent analysis of these
initiatives. However, the WBL has undertaken a self-assessment and has
136. Id.
137. Id. (under "Gender in the Economy Indicator").
138. The MCC favors indicators that, inter alia, have a clear theoretical or empirical link to economic
growth and poverty reduction. Id. (under "Guide to the MCC Indicators").
139. Id. (under "Gender in the Economy Indicator") ("Studies show that legally sanctioned gender
inequality has a significant negative impact on a country's economic growth because it prevents a large
portion [of] the population from fully participating in the economy, thus lowering the average ability of
the workforce.").
140. Id.
141. Id.
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acknowledged shortcomings of its reports, indicating that these omissions are
grounded in methodological limitations: 
142
De jure, not de facto inequality: In focusing exclusively on de jure inequality,
the WBL 2016 report "acknowledges there are frequently large gaps between law
on the books and law in practice, and that women do not always have access to
the equality to which they are entitled under formal law." 143 This focus on dejure
inequality is based on the fact that it is easier to identify dejure law than it is to
measure de facto inequality. While conceding the lack of coverage of de facto
inequality as a limitation, the WBL 2016 report notes that identifying de jure
inequality "is one step towards better understanding where and how women's
economic rights may be restricted in practice." 
144
Formal, not informal, economy and other factors: While the 2016 report
recognizes that "most women in developing economies start businesses or work
in the informal economy," the report focuses on the formal economy, as a main
goal is to identify barriers women face in transitioning from the informal to the
formal economy. 145 The report also acknowledges, but does not measure, factors
referred to as "infrastructure," such as safe transportation and good street
lighting, which "might also affect women's ability and desire to work in certain
locations or at night." 
146
Limited coverage of customary law: The 2016 report does not cover the actual
application of customary law in any detail, even while recognizing that
"customary law can determine a woman's rights to marriage or in property an
inheritance," as it can "exist in parallel with formal legal regimes," 14 7 providing
different rights to women than the formal legal system does. However, the report
does cover the constitutional treatment of customary law, including "whether
customary law is exempt from constitutional provisions on nondiscrimination
and equality." 1
48
Parental leave and child care responsibilities: The 2014 report recognizes that
"[e]qualizing rights to work may not necessarily result in more women entering
the workforce, if they are still expected to be the primary caregivers for their
children, and if access to child care is limited." 14 9 The 2012 report had
downplayed data on childcare-because such issues are not always related to
facially explicit gender differentials-which was a limitation in the earlier
report. 150 Where there were gender differentials in the law, the 2012 report still
142. 2016 WBL REPORT, supra note 71, at 30.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 29.
146. Id.
147. Id. The report goes on to say that customary law is only partially included "because it is often
uncodified, which makes it difficult to define its rules." Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Compare 2016 WBL REPoRr, supra note 71, with 2014 WBL REPoRT, supra note 131.
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downplayed, for example, parental leave benefits because "legal differentiation
in this area is the norm, not the exception."1 5 1 The 2014 report (and now the 2016
report) began covering parental leave and related issues more significantly, which
is an improvement. 
15 2
The problem of composite indicators: As discussed earlier, the MCC has
conflated the WBL's data into the composite "Gender in the Economy Indicator,"
based on only a small set of data provided by the WBL. While its simplicity may
have helped make it saleable internally and helped its marketability, synthesizing
gender equality into a single score based on limited information risks failing to
capture the complexity of gender inequality in the economy.
For example, Nigeria has a relatively high MCC "Gender in the Economy"
score for FY16, 153 even though the government has been extremely ineffective in
addressing Boko Haram's abduction of numerous school girls. Violence against
women and other factors that limit the economic power of women and girls are
simply not taken into account in the MCC score. Moreover, the composite scores
for two different countries are difficult to compare with granularity, given that
composite scores fail to break out the particular components comprising them.
For instance, from the MCC scorecards alone, it is not clear why Kenya has a
higher "Gender in the Economy" score than Nigeria. 154 However, the WBL data
provides an array of quantitative information as well as a discussion of which
countries have adopted significant reforms improving gender equality, which
includes Kenya.
155
Importantly, WBL and MCC staff recognize that the numbers cannot tell the
full story. "When you put a number on something, people think that's the only
thing that matters [when, in fact,] it's just a starting point."1 5 6 Acknowledging the
need for a broad framework, the 2016 WBL report recognizes that "[e]qual
opportunities for women in business and the workplace depend on the interplay
of various economic, social, and cultural factors." 
157
B. CRITIQUES OF OTHER GLOBAL GENDER INDICATORS
Much of the criticism of the other gender indicators tends to be based on the
way these indicators have been conceived, interpreted, and deployed-rather
151. Id. WORLD BANK & IFC, WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE LAW 2012: REMOVING BARRIERS TO
ECONOMIC INCLUSION 13 (2011), http://wbl.worldbank.org//media/FPDKMIWBL/Documents/Reports/
2012/Women-Business-and-the-Law-2012.pdf [hereinafter 2012 WBL REPORT].
152. 2014 WBL REPORT, supra note 131, at 10.
153. MCC Country Scorecards for FY2016, available at https://www.mcc.gov/who-we-fund/scorecards/
eyJyZXNlbHRfcGFnZSI6Indobyl 3ZSlmdW5kXC9zY29yZWNhcmRzIiwiY2FOZWdvcnk6ZmlzY2F
seWVhciI6IjEwODQiLCJsaWlpdCI6IjEwMCJ9.
154. Id.
155. 2016 WBL Report, supra note 71, at 37.
156. Telephone interview with WBL staffer (Mar. 28, 2013).
157. 2016 WBL REPORT, supra note 71, at 29.
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than questioning the normative implications of relying on indicators as a way to
evaluate gender justice.
Feminist economist Caren Grown does an impressive job of summarizing the
criticisms of the GDI and GEM, 15 8 which led to the replacement by the GIl. The
GDI had "conceptual and empirical problems associated with both the life-
expectancy and earned-income components." 15 9 Furthermore, the GDI was
"difficult to interpret in a situation in which gender gaps in the three components
[life expectancy, educational attainment, and income] favor one sex in one
component and another in the other components[, a] problem [that] applies as
well to the GEM[.]" 160 There were also challenges associated with the use of the
GDI, without reference to the HDI. 161 The GDI results were meaningful only
when read in combination with the results of the HDI.
The GEM also suffered from conceptual and empirical issues. Because it used
unadjusted income per capita, "women in rich countries appear relatively more
empowered than women in poor countries with otherwise equal relative shares of
economic and political power." 162 Moreover, by "combining absolute levels of
human development with relative female well-being, [it was] difficult to sort out
which is changing over time-women's relative status or levels of develop-
ment[.]" 163 Further, GEM's heavy emphasis on representation at the national
political level and in the formal economy obscured the important role women
play in local institutions and grassroots organizations. 
164
UNDP established the GIl to address these concerns. However, some who have
been involved in administering it have noted substantial challenges, including
the lack of: (1) gender disaggregated data, (2) time series data, 165 and (3) more
consistent measurement (for example, to make international comparisons more
meaningful). 166
Critics have also discussed a number of data problems with the MDG3
indicators, including availability and quality of data; the difficulty of quantifying
women's empowerment; and the fact that a narrowing of any particular gender
gap, such as a wage gap, might indicate declines for men rather than
158. Grown, Gender Inequality, supra note 106, at 114.
159. Id. at 115.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 114 ("The GDI is not interpretable in itself.... Yet countries, and even the UN Human
Development Reports, have interpreted the GDI a measure of gender inequality[]" reflecting the "great
demand and a need for a direct gender inequality measure.").
162. Id. at 115.
163. Id.
164. Bardhan & Klasen, supra note 102, at 1000-01.
165. Time series data evaluates a set of variables over time, for example, whether girls' school
enrollment has increased from 1980 to 1990.
166. Gaye et al., supra note 111, at 28.
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improvements for women. 167 There are also reporting problems and other
challenges associated with collecting data on violence against women. 168
V. NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENDER INDICATORS FOR THE
FEMINIST PROJECT
This article concludes with the following thoughts on the normative implica-
tions of relying on indicators as a way to evaluate gender justice. Building on the
critiques summarized above, this part analyzes these normative-and, by
extension, related practical-implications of prevailing gender indicators and the
motives underlying them.
Many of the existing gender indicators reflect a thin, formal approach to
gender equality. Considered within the framework of feminist accounts of
international law, many of these indicators fit largely within first-wave, formal
feminist approaches. First-wave liberal assimilationist feminism argues that
women should seek to be more like men by becoming better educated, obtaining
higher paying jobs, and spending less time in the private sphere of the family and
more time in the public sphere of politics and the market. 169 Gender indicators
largely reflect a concern with this type of formal equality.
In response to this formal equality approach, second-wave cultural feminism
asserts that the first-wave liberal assimilationism neglects challenging the
fundamentally problematic value system that associates femininity with inferior-
ity. 170 On this view-represented, for example, in feminist psychologist Carol
Gilligan's "different voice" theory 71  feminism should validate qualities histori-
cally associated with femininity and activities historically assigned to women,
such as mothering and caregiving more generally. 17 2 While most gender
indicators address formal equality, as discussed above, the most recent WBL
167. Grown, Gender Inequality, supra note 106, at 114; see id. at 95, 96, and 98 (discussing each data
problem, respectively). On empowerment, Grown notes proxies for measuring women's empowerment,
including:
(i) decision[-]making over expenditures and resource allocation, social and domestic matters
(for example, cooking), and child-related issues (for example, well-being, schooling, health);
(ii) control over resources (income, assets, unearned income, welfare receipts, household
budget, participation in paid employment); and (iii) mobility or freedom of movement.
Measures of the process of female empowerment are more difficult; most available indicators
tend to measure the enabling factors or conditions for empowerment, such as labor force
participation, female literacy or school enrollment, and political representation by women.
[However,] [o]nly one of these-the share of seats in national parliaments held by females-is
included among the official indicators for monitoring progress toward MDG3." Id. at 96.
168. Id. at 113.
169. For discussion, see generally, CATHARINE MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
170. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, INA DIFFERENT VOICE (1982).
171. Id.
172. For discussion, see Amy Allen, 'Mommy Wars' Redux: A False Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (May 27,
2012, 5:00PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/27/the-mommy-wars-redux-a-false-conflict/
? r-0 [hereinafter Allen, 'Mommy Wars'].
2016]
806 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF GENDER AND THE LAW
reports are beginning to go beyond formal equality, for example by addressing
issues that disproportionately affect women, such as parental leave and child care
policies.
However, both liberal and cultural feminist approaches share a common flaw
by leaving the essentialist conceptual dichotomy between men and women
intact. 17 3 Hence, liberal feminism fails to value femininity, while cultural
feminism, "even as it challenges the prevailing devaluation of femininity, runs
the risk of tacitly legitimating women's marginalization by underscoring how
different [women] are from men."' 17 4 Thus, feminist professor Catharine Mac-
Kinnon insists on deconstructing the structures of dominance and subordination
that trap women. 175 On this view, meaningful equality requires moving beyond
formal equality and embracing substantive equality.
The gender indicators discussed in this article have limited capacity either to
deconstruct structures of dominance and subordination or to pave the way to new
structures that move societies toward substantive equality. Instead, these gender
indicators are geared toward measuring and coaxing inclusion of women in
existing structures, which are largely defined by traditional "male-oriented"
models of success (i.e., that fail to value traditionally female-dominated forms of
unpaid or underpaid work, such as caregiving). Moreover, given the interest that
development agencies, such as the World Bank, have in promoting consistency
that enables comparison across countries and across time, the gender indicators
surveyed here tend to simplify complex social relations and strip them of context
and history. 176 Perhaps better-designed indicators could address these shortcom-
ings, or perhaps indicators need to be supplemented by other forms of
knowledge, including surveys, case studies, and more broadly qualitative
information.
To address the various concerns raised throughout this article, gender
indicators would need to advance approaches that move beyond formal equality
in their operation-as well as in their aspiration. For example, gender indicators
could utilize the feminist methodology of participatory decision-making (includ-
ing in the creation of the indicators themselves). Participatory decision-making
could more effectively disrupt existing structures of dominance and subordina-
tion. Such bottom-up strategies could also pave the way to solutions that are more
responsive to affected individuals and communities. These individuals will have
a greater stake and deeper investment in sustaining solutions that they are
173. For discussion, see generally MAcKINNON, supra note 169.
174. Allen, 'Mommy Wars,'supra note 172.
175. See generally MAcKINNON, supra note 169.
176. Cf Sakiko Fukuda-Parr et al., The Power of Numbers: A Critical Review of MDG Targets
for Human Development and Human Rights 2 (Harv. Sch. Pub. Health Working Paper Series, May
2013), http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Gender/Synthesis%20paper%
20PoN-Final.pdf (noting the reductionism in the way the MDGs' targets were set and "the potential for
distorting priorities and marginalizing, or even displacing, important human development and human
rights concerns inherent in such global goal-setting exercises").
[Vol. XVII:777
GENDER INDICATORS AS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
involved in developing. Thus, these approaches can be more effective as a
practical matter as well as more respectful of the integrity of individuals whose
lives are being measured by indicators.
In sum, rather than co-opt global governance, global institutions have co-opted
gender indicators. Because of their current methodological, conceptual, and
normative limitations, gender indicators are not capable of securing a more
fundamental transformation of global governance. Indicators are a classic
governance device. As with other indicators, gender indicators replicate and
promote the characteristics of governance that have emerged in the eras of
enlightenment, science, and modern government, including individualism,
rationalism, objectivity, and accountability. Yet, quantitative measurements only
create the perception of objectivity, neutrality, and transparency. Indicators, in
fact, embed normative assumptions.
Given the technical nature of indicators, technocrats end up wielding power in
debates over data, shifting the conversation from norms to numbers. The fact that
many leading technocrats are educated in the global North reifies existing
inequalities in global governance by empowering those who govern from afar
over those immediately affected. 177 In this sense, the World Bank WBL case
study reflects feminist Audre Lorde's famous point that the master's tools cannot
dismantle the master's house. 178
Governance almost certainly has a deradicalizing effect on feminism, even as
feminists have come to power in international institutions, in foreign ministries,
in parliaments, and as heads of state. As a mechanism of governance, gender
indicators seek to institutionalize gender equality and thereby reshape policies,
priorities, and laws in both international and national law and development
efforts. But the reach of gender indicators will continue to be limited so long as
they are used primarily to mainstream women into existing structures of power,
rather than to transform those structures.
177. NIKOLAS ROSE, GOVERNING THE SOUL: THE SHAPING OF THE PRIVATE SELF, supra note 67; see also
DAVID KENNEDY, A WORLD OF STRUGGLE: How POWER, LAW, AND EXPERTISE SHAPE GLOBAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY (2016).
178. LORDE, supra note 14.
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